Es wird gezeigt, daß in der Skizze zum Beweis des 2. Satzes von Gödel dieser eine stillschweigende Voraussetzung macht, die im Widerspruch zu den üblichen Forderungen nach Eindeutigkeit der benutzten Terme steht: Eine und dieselbe Gödelzahl g repräsentiert nämlich einmal den Ausdruck g1: "ein im System k unentscheidbarer Satz" und das andere Mal den Ausdruck g2: "g1 ist in k nicht beweisbar". Beachtet man aber diesen Unterschied, so ist der Widerspruch nicht herleitbar, auf dem der Gödelsche Beweis basiert.

F. Brencio (2023), Embodied Attention. A phenomenological hypothesis, in D. Stoyanov (Ed.), Contemporary Neuropsychiatry: Implications from Cognitive Neuroscience, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 26-42.

Recent decades have witnessed a growing number of states around the world relying on border control measures, such as immigration detention, to govern human mobility and control the movements of those classified as “unauthorised non-citizens.” In response to this, an increasing number of scholars from several disciplines, including psychologists, have begun to examine this phenomenon. In spite of the widespread concerns raised, few studies have been conducted inside immigration detention sites, primarily due to difficulties in gaining access. This body of (...) research becomes even scanter when it comes to the experiences of detained women. This study is the first of its kind to have surveyed 93 women confined in an Italian immigration detention facility. A partial mediation model with latent variables was tested through partial least structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM). The findings revealed the negative impact that unfair immigration procedures have on detained women’s human dignity, which in turn negatively affects their self-rated physical and mental health. Overall, our study sheds light on the dehumanisation and damage to human dignity that immigration detention entails, as well as its negative impact on the health of those affected. This evidence reinforces the image of these institutions as sites of persistent injustice, while stressing the need to envision alternative justice-oriented forms to address human mobility. (shrink)

Despite the importance of commitment for distinctively human forms of sociality, it remains unclear how people prioritize and evaluate their own and others’ commitments - especially implicit commitments. Across two sets of online studies, we found evidence in support of the hypothesis that people’s judgments and attitudes about implicit commitments are governed by an implicit sense of commitment, which is modulated by cues to others’ expectations, and by cues to the costs others have invested on the basis of those expectations.

It is well known that Hermann Cohen was one of the first philosophers who engaged in the debate about non-Euclidean geometries and the concept of space. His relation to Hermann von Helmholtz, who played a major role in the same debate, is an illuminating example of how some of the leading ideas of Marburg neo-Kantianism, although motivated independently of scientific debates, naturally led to the examination of scientific works and scientists’ epistemological views. This paper deals with Cohen’s view of magnitudes (...) and measurement and with his – less known – review of Helmholtz’s paper “Zählen und Messen, erkenntnistheoretisch betrachtet”, which contains one of the first attempts to formulate a theory of measurement in the modern sense. The first part provides a brief introduction to this debate in its connection with the earlier discussion on geometrical axioms and the concept of space. The main sections deal with Helmholtz’s and Cohen’s approaches to the foundations of measurement. Cohen’s criticism of some of Helmholtz’s assumptions notwithstanding, my emphasis is on some unexpected affinities between these two approaches. In the concluding section, I rely on the constructive side of Cohen’s criticisms to reconsider the philosophical aspects of Helmholtz’s theory and draw a few comparisons with contemporary measurement theory. (shrink)

Through this contribution I aim to explore the horizons and limits of digital medicine in light of an embodied approach to the issue of care. I will sketch the historical background of digital medicine and show the contemporary status of this interdisciplinary field, as well as its applications and outcomes. Then, I will address a critique of the computational theory of mind (CTM) upon which many contemporary mental health apps are designed. This approach to the mind is inscribed into the (...) modern trend of neuromania, which conceives the embodied, living human being as a mere series of data analyses and algorithms, with the brain as the seat of the person. Drawing on continental philosophy and classical phenomenology I will develop a notion of health conceived as a moral enterprise, showing how wellbeing and vitality are not reducible to a product made by technologies or doctors, but rather they are the results of an embodied encounter. As such, empathy and person-centered care cannot be achieved by digital medicine. They are the result of a journey into the regions of recognition, embodied presence and the aliveness constituting the person. Finally, I will show how the issue of care cannot be separated from an embodied encounter between people, especially in case of dementia. (shrink)

What is a gene? Does it represent a natural kind, or is it just a tool for genomics? A clear answer to these questions has been challenged by postgenomic discoveries. In response, I will argue that the gene can be deemed a natural kind as it satisfies some requirements for genuine kindhood. Specifically, natural kinds are projectible categories in our best scientific theories, and they represent nodes in the causal network of the world (as in Khalidi. Natural Categories and Human (...) Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; Khalidi. Synthese 195: 1379–1396, 2018; Khalidi. Are Sexes Natural Kinds, In: Dasgupta S, Weslake B (eds) Current Controversies in Philoso-phy of Science. Routledge, New York, 2020; Khalidi. Philos Sci 88:1–21, 2021). In Sect. 2, I will present a brief history of the gene and the controversy over its status. In Sect. 3, I will introduce the account of natural kinds considered in this paper. In Sect. 4, I will first present the relevant definition of genes and how they can be classified. Then, I will argue that the gene can be considered a natural kind as it satisfies the criteria for natural kindhood. Section 5 concludes. (shrink)

The global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19) has led to the imposition of severely restrictive measures by governments in the Western hemisphere. We feel a contrast between these measures and our freedom. This contrast, we argue, is a false perception. It only appears to us because we look at the issue through our contemporary moral philosophy of utilitarianism and an understanding of freedom as absence of constraints. Both these views can be (...) substituted with more sophisticated alternatives, namely an ethics of virtue and a notion of freedom of the will. These offer a fuller picture of morality and enable us to cooperate with the current restrictions by consciously choosing to adhere to them instead of perceiving them as draconian and immoral. We ask whether we should collaborate with the restrictions and argue that considerations of virtue will lead to an affirmative answer. More broadly, virtue ethics permits to deal with the practical concerns about how an individual should behave during this pandemic, given the current lockdown measures or lack thereof. -/- In section 1, we present how utilitarianism and a notion of freedom as negative liberty support the opposition to restrictive measures. In section 2, we outline an alternative based on an ethics of virtue and a more elaborated notion of free will. In the concluding section 3, we argue that considerations of virtue should guide the individual and public response to the emergency. (shrink)

This paper employs the interpretative lens provided by stakeholder theory to garner novel insights for research and managerial practices within the framework of high-reliable organizations (HROs). It proposes an interpretative matrix for analyzing and explaining how stakeholders’ behaviors and interactions can transition from a “strategic” to a “responsibility” approach in the context of risk management. The paper adopts a qualitative methodology based on a case study of the Italian Civil Protection—an HRO—during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through the analysis of institutional sources (...) and reports, we apply two theoretical frameworks to examine how the organization's engagement strategy changed in response to an unexpected event. This case serves to illuminate the main implications and practical applications of shared conceptual reflections. The principal implications are traced in terms of theory, practice, and policy, focusing on the joint examination of organizational reliability and stakeholder engagement theory, the potential utility of the proposed case study, and the feasible policy actions. The main limitations of this study lie in the purely qualitative methodology employed, the nature of the organization analyzed, and the territorial scope of the study. Future works will address an empirical investigation of the theoretical relations uncovered herein, as well as the expansion of the spectrum of analysis (e.g., private organizations) and a cross-country widening of the level of analysis. (shrink)

An inquiry drawing on the presence of Hellenistic philosophy in Philo provides a better knowledge of the diffusion of Hellenistic philosophy since the late ...

The topic tackled in this book is Philo's account of the complex, double-sided nature of God's acting - the two-sided coin of God as transcendent yet immanent, ...

F. Brencio (2022), «…this phenomenon, which is none too happily designated as ‘empathy’». Martin Heidegger’s critique of empathy, in “Bollettino Filosofico”, 37, 243-251, ISSN: 1593 – 7178, E-ISSN 2035 - 2670.

In Pregnancy and superior moral status: A proposal for two thresholds of personhood, Robinson argues that pregnant women are unique beings with superior moral status (MS) to that of other adult human beings. Robinson’s defence of this view relies on metaphysical and moral claims. The first set of claims concerns the ontological status of the pregnant woman, whom she considers a ‘unique organism’,‘more than just one person’and ‘numerically increased’.1 The second set of claims concerns the ‘superior’ MS of the pregnant (...) woman. In this commentary, we address this second set of claims and argue that Robinson’s view rests on a misunderstanding of the concept of MS and its role in supplying reasons for action (and forbearance from action). While we welcome the conclusion of Robinson’s argument—which we take to be that pregnant women ought to be treated with more consideration—on an appropriate understanding of MS, her argument does not yield that conclusion at all. We feel strongly that medical ethics needs to be grounded in good philosophy and worry that too much of the literature falls short of this ideal. As such, the spirit in which we write this commentary is that of constructive criticism. ### One plus one equals one plus one and the grounds of MS The philosophical literature on the grounds of MS essentially addresses the question of what properties (Ps) determine whether an agent (A) has MS.1 Examples of Ps are: sophisticated cognitive capacities,2 such as the capacity to value, being self-aware or rational, or more controversially, …. (shrink)

Function talk is a constant across different life sciences. From macro-evolution to genetics, functions are mentioned everywhere. For example, a limb’s function is to allow movement and RNA polymerases’ function is to transcribe DNA. Biochemistry is not immune from such a characterization; the biochemical world seems to be a chemical world embedded within biological processes. Specifically, biochemists commonly ascribe functions to biomolecules and classify them accordingly. This has been noticed in the recent philosophical literature on biochemical kinds. But while a (...) lot has been written on biological and psychological functions, little has been said explicitly about biochemical fuctions. Here, I explore functional attribution to biochemical molecules. I argue that if we accept this attribution, then biochemical functions are constituted by chemical dispositional properties that causally contribute to selected biological processes. In section 2, I discuss the controversy concerning the characterization of biochemical functions. In section 3, I consider whether a biological or a chemical under- standing of function can be applied to biochemical functions, illustrating the account with the example of vitamin B12. The result is that none of the theories on their own provides an adequate characterization. In section 4, I present an account of biochemical functions. In section 5, I assess this account taking into consideration common requirements for a theory of functions and an objection. (shrink)

F. Brencio (2023), Quel che resta delle cose. Riccardo de Biase lettore di Heidegger, in G. Giannini, P. Marangolo, M. Papa (eds.), Segni. Studi in memoria di Riccardo De Biase, TAB Edizioni, Roma 2023, pp. 171-182, ISBN: 978-88-9295-769-5.

Criminal liability for acts committed by AI systems has recently become a hot legal topic. This paper includes three different contributions. The first contribution is an analysis of the extent to which an AI system can satisfy the requirements for criminal liability: accomplishing an actus reus, having the corresponding mens rea, possessing the cognitive capacities needed for responsibility. The second contribution is a discussion of criminal activity accomplished by an AI entity, with reference to a recent case involving an online (...) bot, the Random Darknet Shopper. This discussion will provide the context for the analysis of commonalities and differences between criminal activities by humans and by artificial systems. The third contribution concerns the evaluation of different ways of addressing criminal activities by AI systems in a regulatory perspective. (shrink)

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of ‘genetic enhancement’ has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR ‘eugenics’, rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether ‘eugenics’ can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each (...) other. (shrink)

In this paper, we will explore the relation between molecular structure and functions displayed by biochemical molecules in complex physiological processes by using tools from the philosophy of science and the philosophy of scientific practice. We will argue that biochemical functions are weakly emergent from molecular structure by using an account of weak. In order to explore this thesis, we will consider the role of vitamin B12 in contributing to the process of erythropoiesis. The structure of the paper is the (...) following: First, we will consider biochemical functions and why they cannot be easily reduced to their chemical realisers. We will suggest weak emergence as an alternative while also accounting for the relevance of the context, in our case, systemic and organisational. The paper will conclude by considering (1) how the usage of tools from the philosophy of science, such as weak emergence, can aid our understanding of the relations between the components of complex phenomena, such as erythropoiesis, and (2) how the philosophy of scientific practice sheds light on the explanatory role of processes that are dynamically stabilised and the different levels of organisation implied. (shrink)